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Abstract
In this paper we model the formation of innovation networks as they emerge
from bilateral actions. The eﬀectiveness of a bilateral collaboration is determined
by cognitive, relational and structural embeddedness. Innovation results from the
recombination of knowledge held by the partners to the collaboration, and the extent
to which agents’ knowledge complement each others is an issue of cognitive embed-
dedness. Previous collaborations (relational embeddedness) increase the probability
of a successful collaboration; as does information gained from common third parties
(structural embeddedness). As a result of repeated alliance formation, a network
emerges whose properties are studied, together with those of the process of knowl-
edge creation. Two features are central to the innovation process: how agents pool
their knowledge resources; and how agents derive information about potential part-
ners. We focus on the interplay between these two dimensions, and find that they
both matter. The networks that emerge are not random, but in certain parts of the
parameter space have properties of small worlds.
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1 Introduction
One of the eﬀects of the recent rapid technical advance is a change in the technological
structure of many firms. As new technologies have emerged and been integrated into exist-
ing products and technology spaces, the successful firm now must have access to expertise
covering a much larger scope of technologies than in the past. We have observed a rapid
increase in the prevalence of “multi-technology” firms. Firms have had to incorporate
many new types of expertise both in their production activities, and in innovation (see for
example Powell et al., 1996, Grandstand and Sjolander, 1990; Grandstand, 1996; Teece
and Pisano, 1989). This raises the diﬃculty that knowledge and technology necessary for
innovation may lie outside a firm’s traditional core competence. A now common strategy
for addressing this problem, adopted by more and more firms, is to form alliances, both
with competitors and with non-competing firms and institutions. Inter-firm cooperation
can be extremely eﬀective in increasing the circulation of tacit knowledge, and in creating
possibilities for a firm to acquire knowledge outside its boundaries. Consequently, these
co-operative agreements for R&D have grown dramatically in number since the 1970s.1
The increase in alliances, which have been created for purposes of gathering or exchang-
ing knowledge and information, has led to a new view of industry structure. In the past we
have observed hierarchies and markets as dominant structures. Implicit is a well-defined
notion of the boundary of the firm. As knowledge (and indeed many other things) are pass-
ing between firms in what cannot be described as purely market transactions, analysts have
begun to discuss the network-based organization (see Powell, 1990 for example). Networks
diﬀer from markets and hierarchies in a variety of ways, but can be seen as depending
on particular types of interactions between pairs of agents within the economy. Within
a network structure, firm boundaries are relatively porous, and a firm survives by having
good contacts with other firms who hold complementary assets.
Clearly, the strategic alliance is a central part of the process creating a network struc-
ture within an industry. For any firm seeking to expand its innovation capabilities through
alliance formation, though, there is the question of choosing a partner. Simply partnering
with every other firm is not feasible for many reasons (there are time, resource and man-
agement constraints; competitive considerations would militate against it and so on), so
selecting a partner, acknowledging that many other firms are doing the same, becomes a
strategic issue that firms must deal with. A basic way of analysing this issue is to observe
that alliances do not exist in a vacuum, but are embedded in a variety of other issues.
Analysts have focussed on three: relational embeddedness; cognitive embeddedness; and
structural embeddedness. Each of these features of a possible relationship lends it value,
and they play a central role in determining the desirability of diﬀerent potential partners.
In this paper we examine the creation and evolution of a network of firms through
bilateral alliance formation. The micro-economics of our model deal with the firms’ im-
mediate goal, which is to find an alliance for purposes of innovation, and in the model
each firm’s choice of partner is driven explicitly by concerns of cognitive, structural and
relational embeddedness. These micro-economic activities, however, create an emergent
1See Hagedoorn (2001) for a review and discussion of this trend.
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network structure in which firms are connected to each other through bilateral links.2
In the context of finding an alliance partner, cognitive embeddedness refers to two
agents’ abilities to integrate eﬀectively their respective knowledge. Empirical analyses of
alliance formation conclude that firms look for partners with the best technological fit in
the sense of providing “missing resources”.3 If we consider that a firm has a knowledge
profile, we can think of it as being located in some knowledge or competence space. When
two firms innovate jointly, the action will be most eﬀective if their locations complement
each other. In the literature a Euclidean space has been used, and there is a consensus
that the eﬀectiveness of cooperation has an inverted U-shape in cognitive distance. If
firms are too close together, their knowledge overlaps too much and there is little point
in sharing; if they are too far apart they have diﬃculty understanding each other, and
so sharing is too diﬃcult. The arguments are very appealing intuitively (see for example
Grant, 1996 or Nooteboom, 1999), and Mowery et al. (1998) find this eﬀect empirically. In
the model below we take a more explicit notion of complementarity, using a richer notion
of complementarity than a simple Euclidean distance.
One consequence of a knowledge partnership is that partners will develop closer cogni-
tive ties. That is, their knowledge profiles will, in general become more similar. Mowery
et al. (1998), for example find that “technological overlap between joint venture partners
after alliance formation is greater than their pre-alliance overlap” (p. 517). (See also Dyer
and Nobeoka, 2000.) This has the feature of increasing embeddedness, but after a time
may make firms less attractive to each other, since as they become similar, there is less to
share. This intuition may be misleading in some cases, and as we discuss below, it depends
heavily on the nature of the innovation process, and how firms integrate their competencies
in that process.
Cooperation between firms is risky, and is marked by uncertainty regarding the skills of
the partner, your joint ability to work together, the potential partner’s reliability, his goals
and so on. (See Powell 1990, p. 318 for a discussion of these risks.) This can be cast as
an issue of incomplete information, and the most obvious way to reduce the uncertainty is
to improve the information used in choosing a partner. There are two sources of this type
of information: experience and other agents. The first relates to relational embeddedness,
the second to structural embeddedness (see Uzzi 1996, 1997 for discussion).
Past experiences with an agent will both improve abilities to cooperate, and yield infor-
mation about that agent. Cooperation implies mutual knowledge and sharing of routines,
representations, ways of thinking, the ability to share tacit knowledge and so on: in gen-
eral the creation of some common ground on which the cooperation can be built. Galison
(1999), for example, shows that in experimental physics, cooperation between theorists,
2To model strategic technological alliances in their entirety is far beyond the scope of this paper.
Technological alliances can be very rich and varied, and firms have many motivations for entering into
them. See Oliver (1990) for a discussion of the motivations of firms to form outsider relationships. But
for our purposes we focus on a single eﬀect, namely the production of shared knowledge, and how firms’
behaviour in this regard leads to the emergence of networks.
3This idea has a long history in the management literature, going back to Penrose (1959). See Chung
et al. (2000); Doz (1988); Hamel et al. (1989); Narula (1999); Richardson (1972); Teece (1986) among
others. In this regard, one diﬃcult issue has to do with how resources of partners are combined, which in
turn determines what “complementary” means. This is an issue we address directly below.
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experimentalists and instrument makers is made possible by the emergence of some sort
of “creole”, an intermediary level knowledge specific to a given pair of actors, that has
been built through their repeated interactions. This common ground can be built through
the experience of cooperation (Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2002). In addition, repeated in-
teraction creates trust in the broadest sense (both in terms of motives and in terms of
competencies) and the importance of predictability implies that trust construction and
learning are strongly related (Sako, 1991; Dodgson, 1996). All of these considerations will
clearly create an inertia in partnership formation, and a stability in the emergent network
structures: agents will, all else equal, prefer partners they have worked with in the past.
Powell et al. (1996) show that firms that have engaged in partnerships in the past are
more likely to engage in them in the future. This is a general result. Chung et al. (2000),
Gulati (1995) and Roijakkers (2003) all find that if two particular firms have allied with
each other in the past, these two firms are more likely to have an alliance together in the
future.
The second source of information about potential partners is other agents (see Kogut et
al. 1992, for example). Those who have worked with a firm will have experience that they
can, in principle, share with others who might be considering working with that firm. This
is captured by the idea that many alliances exhibit structural embeddedness: there is some
tendency for firms to find partners that are close to them in network space. In the model
we develop below, this source of information is included explicitly: a firms perceived value
to me as a partner increases if my previous partners have had good experiences with that
firm. My network of immediate contacts is a source of information about possible future
contacts.
The entanglement of these diﬀerent eﬀects – learning about partners and learning
from partners – makes analysis of network formation tricky. Both Chung et al. (2000)
and Gulati (1995), examining very diﬀerent industries, find that both a history of direct
interactions and indirect ties aﬀect the probability that two firms will form a partnership
in the future. As the number of past ties between two firms increases the probability
that they will form a partnership together in the future increases and then decreases.
There seems to be a concave relationship. While it seems reasonable that the eﬀect of a
shared history should taper oﬀ, it is not immediately clear why it should turn negative
at any point. Similarly, the number of indirect links between two firms has an eﬀect on
the probability that they will form a direct link or partnership in the future: the eﬀect
is initially positive, but again tapers oﬀ, Chung et al. suggesting that their data display
an inverted-U.4 That a shared history or shared neighbours could have a negative eﬀect
seems odd. The explanation may be in the diﬃculty of measuring their other explanatory
variable, namely strategic complementarity. Both papers acknowledge that this is a diﬃcult
variable to measure, and both provide a static measure of it. This means that in their
implicit model, when two firms interact there is no eﬀect on the strength of their strategic
complementarity. We have argued that this is likely not to be the case, and in fact that
strategic complementarity should weaken after a point, as two firms continue to interact
4This claim should be treated cautiously, since the peak occurs at 185 alliances according to their
calculations.
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and learn from each other, their knowledge bases will eventually have too big an overlap
(and indeed this convergence is what Mowery et al., 1998, and Uzzi, 1997, find). Such an
eﬀect would explain a decrease in strength, and even a negative eﬀect, of past interactions
on the probability that two firms interact in the future. The model that we develop below
has this built in, and under certain conditions about the nature of the complementarity,
this eﬀect is clear.
In this paper we design an agent-based model of network formation in which agents are
repeatedly forming bilateral pairs for the purposes of creating new knowledge.5 We abstract
from pure “network-oriented” strategic motives of firms, such as filling structural holes
(Burt, 1992), or increasing their positions of centrality (Podolny, 1993). We focus instead
on the eﬀects of firms’ motivations driven by short-term innovation concerns. Partnerships
are embedded cognitively, structurally and relationally, and this embeddedness directly
influences the choice of partner by every firm.6 Over time this bilateral link formation
process results in an emergent structure which is characterised as an industrial network.7
We analyse the eﬀects of the nature of the innovation process, and the way firms can
eﬀectively pool their knowledge on the structure that emerges and on the nature of the
knowledge that is held by the network.
2 The model
We present here a schematic description of the model before turning to the formal descrip-
tion. Each period every firm forms an alliance with one other firm, based on the output
that they expect from the collaboration. If preferable a firm can also choose isolation. An
alliance having formed, the firms pool their knowledge and use the joint knowledge stock as
inputs into new knowledge production. If the alliance is successful, and new knowledge is
created, this is added to each firm’s existing stock of knowledge, and then the partnership
is dissolved. In the next period firms form new alliances, possibly with previous partners,
5There is now a growing literature in economics on network formation, but the majority of it treats
the problem in game-theoretic terms, looking for stable structures that emerge from agents’s one-time
decisions about whether to form links. The concern in this literature tends to be whether the stable
networks are eﬃcient. (For a recent survey see Jackson and Dutta, 2003.) This work tends not to address
the evolutionary nature of network formation and operation, and tends to have a thin model of firm
behaviour. For an example of adaptive networks in the context of customer loyalty, see Kirman and Vriend
(2001).
6These three types of embeddedness span the two types of explanations for partner choice in the litera-
ture, namely resource complementarity and social structural context. In this regard the model we develop
here is in the tradition of empirical work such as Gulati (1995) and Chung et al. (2000) which find support
for both explanations.
7Recent empirical analysis of economic networks has focused to a large extent on their structural prop-
erties, in particular whether various networks are small worlds. In general the answer is yes. Co-authorship
in a variety of academic disciplines (Newman, 2001); patent citation in US biotech (Johnson and Mareva,
2002); interlocking corporate directorships in the US (for example, Davis et al., 2003); technology alliances
(Duysters and Verspagen, forthcoming); the BRITE/EURAM network and the 5th Framework TSER
network (Cowan and Jonard, 2004) all have small world properties, and there is a consensus that small
worlds are pervasive. A second structure that has received attention recently is the scale free network
(Barabasi and Albert, 2000). Riccaboni and Pammolli (2000) find that networks in the life sciences and
ICT industries have scale free properties.
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possibly with new partners. This repeated bilateral partnership formation and dissolu-
tion generates the emergence and evolution of an economy-wide network structure, fosters
knowledge growth, and changes the knowledge endowments of the firms in the economy.8
Formally, consider a finite population of agents denoted S = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent
i ∈ S is characterized by a knowledge endowment of several types of knowledge. This is
represented as a vector v (i) = (v1 (i) , . . . , vm (i)), where each element vm (i) ≥ 0 represents
the amount of knowledge of typem = 1, . . . ,m held by agent i. This representation permits
us to treat agents as located in an m-dimensional knowledge space. Knowledge is thus
treated as a form of human capital, of which distinct types exist. This notation describes
the agents, and we use it throughout. We treat individually the two parts of the model:
knowledge creation, and partnership formation.
2.1 Knowledge production
Both knowledge and innovation are very diﬃcult to characterize satisfactorily, and any
characterization has its weaknesses. We adopt the simple vector characterization of knowl-
edge described above, but focus more attention on the properties of joint innovation. A
representation of the innovation process should satisfy several minimal requirements (for
supporting evidence see Mowery et al., 1998; Uzzi, 1997). Consider two individuals i and j
who innovate together. After innovation has taken place, one would expect the following to
be true: the knowledge amounts held by i and j have increased; the knowledge “profiles”
of i and j have changed; and the similarity of the knowledge profiles of i and j (that is the
relative distance between them in the knowledge space) has fallen.
Operationally, each pair of agents (i, j) creates an amount of new knowledge deter-
mined by a production function, and this amount is simply added to both partners’ ex-
isting knowledge endowments. This process is very simple in principle and satisfies the
three requirements just described. Recall that each period agents form pairs (in a process
discussed below), and the knowledge that they bring to the pair is pooled, then serving as
input to the innovation process. The pooling is done through
vm (i, j) = (1− θ)min{vm (i) , vm (j)}+ θmax{vm (i) , vm (j)}, m = 1, . . . ,m. (1)
The pooling of course remains virtual, as each of the partners remains the owner of his own
skills. Nevertheless, it permits a useful formalization, permitting a concise representation
of the inputs available for the joint innovation production process.
In Equation (1), θ reflects the nature of the knowledge pooling which the knowledge cre-
ation task demands. If it is possible to separate the sub-tasks in the innovation process, the
agents will specialize, each agent doing some sub-tasks, and bringing the results together at
the end to create the complete innovation. Here, since specialization is possible, the better
8We have assumed here that agents are pursuing knowledge for its own sake. This is unrealistic in general
for firms, who pursue knowledge more generally for the sake of profits. To incorporate that explicitly in
the model adds significant complication, demanding a fully blown goods market with production and
consumption. We avoid that by this simplifying assumption, which, in an industry involved in rapid
technical change, will be behaviourally quite adequate.
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econometrician will do the econometrics; the better growth theorist will do the growth the-
ory, and so on, and thus the pooled knowledge vector is the element-wise maximum of the
individual vectors. θ is close to one. By contrast, if the tasks are not separable, and both
partners must be involved in every sub-task, then the weaker partner will be a bottleneck:
the pooled knowledge vector will be the element-wise minimum, and θ is close to zero.
The advantage of this formalization is that we can avoid specifying a particular distance
function, and an optimal distance (the peak of the inverted-U). More specifically, it per-
mits us to have a richer model of joint innovation than is usually considered (for example
by Mowery et al., 1998; Nooteboom, 2000; Alstyne and Brynjolfsson, 1996, 1997; Peretto
and Smulders, 2002) in which a simple Euclidean distance in knowledge space determines
the eﬀectiveness of a partnership. Putting knowledge together involves considering deeper
issues of complementarities, captured by the production function approach.
Knowledge pooling is where strategic complementarity is defined. What counts as a
complement depends on the nature of the innovation process, and thus on the nature of
the way knowledge can be pooled. On this interpretation θ turns out to be a measure
of the taste for dissimilar partners. If θ is close to 0 then for any element m, in which
vm (j) < vm (i), agent j reduces the eﬀectiveness of i. The converse is true as well. In
this case, agents will be driven to find partners similar to themselves, so they create as
little drag on each other as possible, and possibly agents end up alone. By contrast, if θ is
close to 1, agents look for partners whose endowments tend to complement their own, since
they can benefit from each others’ strengths. Implicitly, they search for partners who are
diﬀerent from themselves in the sense of being good where they are bad. Naturally every
agent would still prefer to be with someone better than him in every discipline, but then
the dominant agent would refuse the partnership.
The pooled knowledge vector serves as the vector of inputs to the innovation production
function. To formalize this, we use a standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
production function φ : Rm+ → R+, with
φ (v (i, j)) =
(X
m
(vm (i, j))β
)1/β
. (2)
The parameter β ≤ 1, β 6= 0, is an inverse measure of the elasticity of substitution across
knowledge types, which is written as 1/ (1− β) . To see how it aﬀects the type of part-
nerships wanted, consider an agent with asymmetric profile (i.e. marked strengths and
weaknesses) and remark that φ is symmetric in its arguments and homogeneous. In gen-
eral this agent would like to find a partnership such that the joint profile is more evenly
distributed and so a higher isoquant can be reached. How desirable this is varies with the
degree of substitutability across knowledge types. When β is small the agent is very eager
to find a partnership and many diﬀerent partners will complement him in such a way that
his innovation output increases. By contrast, when β is close to 1, being evenly skilful
becomes less important since substitution between diﬀerent knowledge types gets easier.
Consequently, less networking should be observed.
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2.2 Innovative success and experience
An innovation project may fail, and the projected new knowledge may not be created. Here
history is important since project success is driven in part by familiarity of the partners,
and the nature of the embeddedness of the partnership, as discussed above.
Suppose i and j have had partnerships in the past. The probability that i and j, will
have a successful collaboration is determined by the information they have about each
other at the time of the collaboration. As discussed in the introduction, information has
two sources: their shared history, and mutual former partners. Our focus will be on how the
balance between my own history (direct information) and my partners’ histories (indirect
information) aﬀects my decisions.
Conditional to what has happened up to period t−1, define the a priori probability that
a collaboration between i and j in the next period, t, is successful as πt (i, j) = πt (j, i).
Suppose further that their previous collaboration took place s(i, j) periods ago (so in period
t − s (i, j)). (Henceforth we drop the t subscript for readability.) Now define the direct
credit of the pair (i, j) in period t to be
γ(i, j) = ρs(i,j)χ (i, j) , (3)
where 0 < ρ < 1 is a discount factor, and χ (i, j) = 1 if i and j had a successful interaction
when they last tried s(i, j) periods ago, while χ (i, j) = 0 otherwise. Equation (3) captures
the simple assumption of learning to collaborate by successfully collaborating. The more
distant our previous success is in time, the less credit we have in each other’s eyes (and the
less likely it is that our next attempt is a success). In case of a failure zero credit obtains.
Focussing solely on Equation (3) would give rise to a situation in which partners are a
source of (possibly) complementary knowledge, but no information about other agents,
and my own interactions are the only basis on which to judge the value of other agents as
potential partners.
In a similar way, define now the indirect credit of the pair (i, j) in period t to be
η (i, j) =
X
k 6=i6=j
ρs(i,k)χ (i, k) · ρs(k,j)χ (k, j) , (4)
where χ (i, k) and χ (k, j) are defined as earlier. The product χ (i, k)χ (k, j) is non zero
only if the last attempt of i and k was a success, and the last attempt of k and j was a
success. Through the decay term ρs(i,k)ρs(k,j) indirect credit also weakens as time passes
without new successes. A sketch of the way this works would be as follows. Suppose I am
interested in agent j. I look through my list of past partners, and when I find one with
whom I was successful in our most recent interaction, I ask, “In your latest interaction
with j, were you successful [which determines χ (k, j)], and if so, when was that interaction
[which determines ρs(k,j)]?” The sum of these over all my previous partners determines the
indirect credit between me (i) and j. Focussing solely on Equation (4) would imply that
partners, in addition to being a source of (possibly) complementary knowledge, are the
only source of information.
In general both direct and indirect information or credit will be considered, so to inter-
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polate between the two extremes the credit of the pair (i, j) will be a weighted sum of the
two, according to
c (i, j) =
αγ(i, j)
α+ (1− α)
P
k 6=i χi,kχk,j
+
(1− α) η (i, j)
α+ (1− α)
P
k 6=i χi,kχk,j
, (5)
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 the weight of the agent’s own opinion. This way c (i, j) accounts for
both i’s direct knowledge of j (as captured by γ(i, j)) and the knowledge accessed by i via
neighbours who are common to j, as measured by η (i, j) . Then the probability that the
next collaborative attempt is a success is simply assumed to be
π (i, j) = πL + (πH − πL)c (i, j) , (6)
and the expected amount of knowledge produced by a cooperation between i and j can be
expressed as
F (i, j) = π (i, j) · φ(v (i, j)). (7)
This is the amount of knowledge produced in case of success multiplied by the probability
that the cooperation succeeds. (Thus agents are assumed to be risk-neutral.) Firms that
innovate in isolation have one source of risk removed, namely that associated with having
to work with a partner. This does not make autarchic innovation a sure thing though: we
assume that a firm innovating alone is successful with probability πH . Given this, πL plays
a central role in a firm’s decision to operate in autarchy rather than collaborating. A larger
baseline probability of failure associated with the partner’s contribution (lower πL) will
obviously imply a stronger tendency for firms to conduct innovative projects in isolation.
Note that F (i, j) = F (j, i) , i.e. the score function is symmetric.
If the innovation project is successful, and new knowledge is created, it is added to
each of the partners’ knowledge vectors. The general intuition is that as an agent uses
knowledge or is exposed to it, he will assimilate at least part of it, and will thereby change
the precise area of his expertise. As the argument of the production function is the joint
knowledge profile, it seems natural to let this joint profile also determine the type of
knowledge produced.9 It is assumed that the probability, conditional to the collaboration
being successful, of the new knowledge being of type m is
vm (i, j)P
m v
m (i, j)
. (8)
If the collaboration fails, both agents get 0.
9We have explored other variants in which a share of the new knowledge is allocated according to the
joint profile to a category common to both participants, while the remaining part is allocated according
to each partner’s profile. As long as the share of new knowledge allocated according to the joint profile is
not negligible, the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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2.3 Pair formation and equilibrium
We draw on the literature on matching problems for our basic model of pair formation.
Because we consider a single population of firms rather than two populations (of jobs
and workers for instance) matching here is a roommate problem, rather than a standard
marriage problem. A one-sided, roommate, matching problem is defined as follows (see
Gale and Shapley, 1962). Each individual i ∈ S has a strict preference ordering Âi over all
the individuals in S−{i}. All preferences are complete and transitive. Let Â = {Âi, i ∈ S}
denote the profile of the preference orderings of all the individuals in S. We generalize the
standard roommate problem to include the possibility of self-matching. This is done in
a straightforward way: the preference ordering is over the entire set S. The pair (S,Â)
is a generalized roommate matching problem, and a matching is a partition of S into q
singletons and (n− q)/2 pairs of roommates, that is to say a bijection µ : S → S such that
µ(µ(i)) = i for all i ∈ S.
Having defined a matching, the equilibrium concept can be presented. A matching µ is
said to be stable in (S,Â) if there is no (i, j) /∈ µ such that both j Âi µ(i) and i Âj µ(j).
Put another way, stability is characterized by the non-existence of blocking pairs. In the
particular problem examined here, the preference profile Â is generated by the expected
output of a pairing F : S2 → R+, which associates to any pair of individuals (i, j) a value
that represents the expected innovative output of this pair. In the event that i = j the
pooled vector is simply the vector of i, and production remains defined as it was above.
The profile of preference orderings of i ∈ S is then defined for all (j, k) in S2 by
j Âi k iﬀ F (i, j) > F (i, k), (9)
i.e. preferences are directly derived from expected output.
Before turning to the emergence of network structure and the associated knowledge
dynamics, we discuss in further detail the market clearing mechanism present in this model.
Because agents in any pair assign the same cardinal value to their match, a unique stable
matching always exists, i.e. the market for alliances always possesses a unique equilibrium.
We prove this by construction.
Proposition 1 The roommate matching problem (S,Â) with preferences given by Equation
(9) has a unique stable matching µ.
The formal proof is given in the appendix. It is quite simple, as is the intuition. Of
all possible pairs of agents in the economy one pair produces the biggest innovation. The
two agents in that pair will block any matching in which they are not together, because
each prefer each other to anyone else. That pair of agents must be in the stable match.
Consider the sub-population which excludes that pair. Within that sub-population there
is a most innovation potential pair. They too must be joined in the stable match. This
recursive argument generates a unique stable matching. As we allow for self-matching the
argument naturally extends to the case of isolated agents maximizing innovative output.
It is worth noting that unlike the standard matching problems, here agents are permitted
to remain as individuals, innovating autarchically. What drives this is the trade-oﬀ between
9
an agent’s ability to substitute between diﬀerent types of his own knowledge, and what he
gets by joining another. In a partnership, an agent will have access to superior knowledge of
type m, but then will also necessarily be forced to accept a lower value of type `, because
of the partner’s inferior knowledge of that type. This trade-oﬀ is evaluated diﬀerently
depending on the elasticity of substitution in production (β), and on the divisibility of
the innovation task (θ) and thus on how heavily is the maximum weighted in knowledge
pooling.
To see how this works, consider agent i as a point in knowledge space: Rm+ . No
collaboration will take place with any j if i dominates j in every knowledge type, since
combining knowledge with j will necessarily put i on a lower isoquant. Similarly, j will
reject a partnership with i if j dominates. So i must search for a partner in the region
Ai ⊂ Rm+ such that vm (i) > vm (j) for some m and vm (i) < vm (j) for others. In words
this means that a necessary condition for collaboration potentially to form is that there is
a complementarity between the potential partners: I must be stronger than you in some
way, and you must be stronger than me in some other way. Now consider θ = 0 (pooling is
on the minimum). Even for potential partners in Ai agent i will refuse all collaborations,
as he loses in the categories where vm (i) > vm (j), and gains nowhere. Symmetrically if
θ = 1, i will accept any collaborator in Ai and will be accepted by any j ∈ Ai, since both
of them gain in at least one knowledge type. This suggests that more collaborations should
be possible when θ is larger.
Proposition 2 As θ increases, the possibilities of collaboration as captured by the number
of acceptable partners increase for any agent i ∈ S.
The formal proof is given in the appendix; again it is simple and intuitive. There is an
indiﬀerence frontier such that i will consider collaboration with j ∈ Ai if j’s endowments
are above the frontier, and not if they are below the frontier. As θ increases from 0 to 1
the frontier moves lower and so more people become acceptable to i. As this eﬀect of θ is
true for anyone, i also becomes acceptable to more people.10
These two results will be useful in guiding our interpretation of the results of the
dynamic system. First we know that in any period there is a unique set of partnerships
that will emerge. Second we know that potentially, more partnerships are available to each
individual as θ increases, which implies that there is a static eﬀect whereby for larger values
of θ there will be fewer isolated individuals each period. In addition there is a dynamic
eﬀect of θ. As discussed above, after two agents have jointly innovated, they add the same
amount and type of knowledge to their respective stocks. That is, they move the same
distance, parallel to one axis in the Rm+ knowledge space. Both the isoquant map from
the innovation production function, and the map of the indiﬀerence frontiers determining
the area of knowledge space in which fruitful partners can be found, are families of convex
curves, becoming “more parallel” to the axes as quantities increase. This implies that by
moving in lock-step parallel to the axes, eventually one agent moves out of the acceptable
10Implicit in the way this is worded would be an assumption that agents are distributed uniformly over
Rm+ . This is purely to facilitate exposition. The intuition generated through this linguistic shortcut is not
misleading.
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area of the other. When this happens, they search for new partners. If θ is large, new
partners are relatively easy to find, and we would expect the result is that agents have
relatively many distinct partners over the history of the ecoonomy.
3 Numerical experiment
The model just developed represents a complex dynamic process. As such it is impossible
to track analytically, so we use numerical experiments to examine how the performance of
the system responds to diﬀerent parameters. We are concerned with two parameters here:
the nature of the innovation task (whether divisible or not) and consequently the nature of
knowledge pooling as measured by θ; and the relative importance of direct versus indirect
information about potential partners as measured by α. These parameters are varied in
the numerical experiments below, in order to understand their eﬀects on network structure
and knowledge growth and distribution.
We study a population of n = 100 firms. At the outset individual knowledge endow-
ments are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over [0,1], independently for every
element vm (i) in each agent’s knowledge vector. Each period, the market for collaborative
agreements is activated and firms form pairs (or stay alone) in order to innovate. The
pairing results in a stable matching where stability is defined as above (everybody is as
satisfied as possible, given everyone else’s preferences), and where the value of a pair is
equal to the expected amount of knowledge produced by that pair. After innovation, the
new knowledge is added to the firms’ knowledge stocks; the firms’ knowledge types change,
as described previously; and so does accumulated experience. At the end of the period all
pairs disband, and the process begins again in the following period. We iterate this process
for 1,000 rounds, recording data for the entire history of the industry. In the numerical
experiments reported below we chose the initial probability of a success to be πL = .9, and
learning gradually increases it to values close to πH = .99. We fix the elasticity of substi-
tution in the innovation production function at β = 1/4. Discounting is performed with a
discount factor ρ = .95. The parameters we examine are α and θ. Regarding pooling (θ) we
consider 100 randomly generated values uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Similarly α takes
100 uniformly distributed values in [0, 1]. We thus have a large data sample on which we
apply a simple non-parametric estimation technique – Kernel regression (Yatchew, 1998
for a comprehensive presentation) – which basically amounts to local averaging.
Regarding the properties of knowledge accumulation, we are interested in the allocation
of knowledge both across individuals, and “within” individuals. Knowledge is used for
innovation, so we define as our knowledge measure an agent’s “innovative potential”, that
is, how much innovation an agent could produce on his own. In this way, rather than
simply summing an agent’s diﬀerent knowledge types, we aggregate into a scalar which is
easier to interpret. Letting φ =
P
i φ (v (i)) designate total innovative potential, equity in
allocation across individuals can be assessed by considering the coeﬃcient of variation
v =
qP
i φ (v (i))
2 /n− (φ/n)2
φ/n
. (10)
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Large values of v indicate the coexistence of rich and poor knowledge agents, while lower
values of v indicate a more even distribution.
At the individual level symmetrically the specialization index si of individual i can be
defined via the coeﬃcient of variation in his endowments s (i) = σ (i) /v¯ (i) , where v¯ (i) is
the average knowledge level of i and σ (i) the standard deviation. The larger this index
is the more of a specialist and less of a generalist i is. Summing across the population
produces a normalized specialization index s =
P
i s (i) , for which large values indicate a
population of experts, while low values indicate a population of generalists.
Regarding the network, in any period t the static network consists of q isolated agents
and (n−q)/2 disconnected pairs, as given by the stable matching µt. To study the properties
of the dynamic network, we record the list of connections active over time. This generates
a weighted graph, in which the weight of an edge indicates how frequently the two firms
have interacted in the history.
Denote (S, Vt) the graph associated with the stable matching achieved at time t, with
Vt (i, j) = 1 if (i, j) ∈ µt, and Vt (i, j) = 0 otherwise. The weighted graph recording
past interactions is denoted (S,Wt), where Wt (i, j) is the frequency of activations of the
connection between i and j, obtained as Wt (i, j) =
P
1≤s≤t Vs (i, j) /t. For this graph we
study the properties of the distribution of collaborative links, specifically the average path
length and the clustering coeﬃcient (cliquishness in Watts and Strogatz, 1998). To move
fromWt to a 0/1 graph, distances must be computed first. The distance d (i, j) between two
nodes i and j is the number of edges in the highest frequency path linking them. Indeed any
path i0, i1, . . . , iz with i0 = i and iz = j has an associated frequency
Q
l=1,...,zWt (il−1, il)
and a length z ≥ 1. Thus between two agents i and j a path with maximum frequency
exists, and its length is denoted d (i, j) . The average path length is then
d =
1
n (n− 1)
X
i
X
j 6=i
d (i, j)
and simply measures how distant vertices are on average (its inverse is sometimes referred
to as closeness centrality in social networks analysis). Denoting Γ (i) = {j 6= i : d (i, j) = 1}
the neighbourhood of vertex i and ni = #Γ (i) the size of i’s neighbourhood, the average
degree of the graph is
∆ =
1
n
X
i
ni.
The average degree ∆ measures the density of the interaction structure.
Another interesting feature of network structure is the extent to which there is asym-
metry in the connectivity of agents, that is, the extent to which stars exist (agents having
much larger neighbourhoods than others). The measure we use is network centralization,
i.e. the variance in the distribution of links over agents normalized by the variance that
would obtain in a perfect star network of the same size.
The clustering (or cliquishness) coeﬃcient is the share of active links between any given
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vertex’s neighbours, averaged over the system. It is written
c =
1
n
X
i
X
j,l∈Γ(i)
X (j, l)
ni (ni − 1)
,
where X (j, l) = 1 if d (j, l) = 1 and 0 otherwise.
4 Results
In the sections that follow, the results are displayed as shaded contour plots, which should
be read as maps in an atlas: darker greys imply higher values on the z axis. This provides
a compact display of the relationship between the relative importance of my information
(α), the pooling parameter (θ), and the performance measures we are concerned with.
4.1 Network
In this section we examine how several measures of network structure respond to changes
in the two parameters in the model.
4.1.1 Degree
Figure 1 displays the number of connections held by the average agent, that is, how many
distinct partners an agent has, on average, over the history of the economy. There is a
region below θ = .25 in which autarchic innovation prevails, so the degree of the network
is consistently 0. This follows from the intuitions of Proposition 2. Once this critical value
of θ is crossed, degree increases both when the decomposition of tasks becomes easier (θ
increases) and when the relative importance of direct (versus indirect) credit (α) decreases.
The first eﬀect stems largely from the properties of the innovative process. In terms
of Proposition 2 this can be seen by considering the conditions under which agents prefer
collaboration to autarchy. Statically, as θ increases, the range of other knowledge vectors
that would generate an improvement over autarchy is larger, so there are more prospective
partners. This implies that in each period, there are likely to be fewer agents innovating
in isolation. In addition, increasing θ increases the propensity of the stable matching to
create pairs of unlike agents. But repeated interaction makes agents more alike in knowledge
profiles, so with higher θ they are likely to switch partners more frequently. This dynamic
eﬀect combined with the static eﬀect explains the eﬀect of θ on average degree in Figure
1. The other eﬀect is the eﬀect of α, the importance of the private signal versus the social,
constructed one. When own experience is weighted heavily (α ≥ .75), an agent’s networking
is focussed on a very small number of people (never more than 5). On the contrary when
I take into account the information provided by my partners about their partners, indirect
credit accumulates and increases the attractiveness of new people. In essence, previous
partners are valuable in introducing an agent to new potential partners. This is what
we observe in Figure 1 when moving right to left for high enough θ. When I value my
partners’ information more heavily than my own, (α ≤ .5), we observe a steady increase in
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Figure 1: Degree of the emerging network in the (α, θ)-space.
the average number of partners as secondary information increases in relative value. In the
extreme, when an agent disregards his own information and uses only that acquired from
his previous partners, agents form alliances with fully 20 percent of the population.
4.1.2 Connectedness
Figure 2 is a binary indicator of the connectedness of the network (0 for disconnected; 1
for connected; intermediate grey levels are artefacts of the Kernel smoothing procedure).
The pattern is driven by θ: when θ exceeds a critical level of about .75, a single connected
component emerges. This eﬀect works through the nature of optimal partnerships and the
dynamics of knowledge as discussed in the previous paragraph. It is a consequence of rising
degree, roughly independent of α.
Looking at Figures 1 and 2 together we can see that for .25 ≤ θ ≤ .75 we have a
disconnected graph with low degree (between 1 and 5) over the entire α-range. Within this
zone the network consists of connected sub-components; that is, as the network evolves
over time, small isolated groups form. We will see below that these groups are relatively
densely connected.
4.1.3 Path Length
Figure 3 depicts average shortest path lengths (distances) between agents in the network.
Because a disconnected graph has some agents who are infinitely distant from each other,
the averages shown in Figure 3 are computed only for the networks that are connected, i.e.
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Figure 2: Connectedness of the emerging network in the (α, θ)-space.
the black parts of Figure 2. Figure 3 is the mirror image of Figure 1. Path lengths fall as
density increases, as one would expect, and this is the dominating eﬀect.
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Figure 3: Average path length of the emerging network in the (α, θ)-space.
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For the sake of comparison, we can consider random graphs of equivalent degree. From
Figure 1, the degree of our networks fall from roughly 20 to 2 when θ = 1 and from 5 to 2
when θ = .75. A random graph of uniform degree ∆ has average path length of lnn/ ln∆,
which implies that if our networks were random, path lengths would rise from about 1.5
to 6.6 as α increases from 0 to 1 for θ = 1, but from 2.6 to 6.6 when θ = .75. The path
lengths in our networks are slightly longer than those of equivalent random graphs, which
suggests that there is more structure than a random connection model would predict. The
nature of that structure can further be characterised by looking at cliquishness.
4.1.4 Cliquishness
Figure 4 displays the average share of an agent’s neighbours who are also neighbours of
each other (the number of triangles divided by the number of possible triangles). Thus this
coeﬃcient measures the degree of local transitivity emerging in the network. In the white
region at the bottom of the graph all firms always innovate as individuals rather than as
part of a pair. There clustering is defined to be zero. Above the collaborative threshold
and in the region α ≤ .5 we observe relatively high levels of cliquishness, getting higher as
we move left. This time the pattern is weakly increasing with θ and markedly decreasing
with α.
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
Weight of own opinion (alpha)
P
oo
lin
g 
(th
et
a)
    0.25
     0.1
 0  0.25  0.5  0.75  1
 0
 0.25
 0.5
 0.75
 1
Figure 4: Cliquishness of the emerging network in the (α, θ)-space.
This measure of cliquishness can be misleading, though, since it is strongly correlated to
the degree of the graph. As agents acquire more links, even if they are acquired at random,
the network will become more dense locally. To get a better measure of the structure of the
graph, it is necessary to compare cliquishness with that of a network of known structural
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properties as we did for distance. Excess cliquishness, as shown in Figure 5, re-scales the
measure from Figure 4 to make it comparable to a random graph with the same average
degree (which has cliquishness of approximately ∆/n.) Figure 5 shows the ratio of observed
over “predicted” cliquishness. Values significantly larger than 1 would indicate a structure
richer than a random graph. There is a very clear eﬀect of α, and also a visible eﬀect of θ.
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Figure 5: Excess cliquishness of the emerging network in the (α, θ)-space.
When the source of information about possible partners is mostly my past partners (say
α < .5), excess cliquishness is much bigger than 1: it is often larger than 3 and in the zone
(α, θ) ∈ [0, .25] × [.25, .75] it is even larger than 6. This says that transitive groups are
forming in zones with relatively low degree (between 1 and 10), while the graph as a whole
is still not connected. Above θ = .75 the graph connects and even there, as long as α is
less than .5, normalized cliquishness significantly exceeds 1 and often exceeds 3. Recalling
the discussion of Figure 3, in which we observed path lengths slightly larger than those of
a random graph, the networks that emerge here, (θ > .75, α < .5), have the characteristic
properties of small worlds: they are sparse, cliquish and have short paths. The general
pattern is that as “second hand” information becomes increasingly important in evaluating
potential partners, the network becomes more cliquish. The apparent exception, in the
upper left corner of the space, is an artefact of the high density in that region. When
agents have many partners, even a random network is highly cliquish (in the extreme case
of a complete graph, cliquishness is at it’s maximum of 1). Thus it will be diﬃcult for any
network to have values of cliquishness that are much higher than the equivalently dense
random network (yet values larger than 1 are observed).
This suggests three regions, and three types of structures. When the innovation task
is not separable, (very low θ) agents act in isolation. As separability becomes possible,
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but is not extreme, the network resembles a caveman graph: we see small groups of agents
who are densely connected within themselves, but isolated from the rest of the economy.
When innovation consists of largely seprable tasks, small world structures begin to emerge,
provided indirect sources of information remain relatively important.
What this result suggests is that the process generating small worlds depends heavily
both on the cognitive properties of innovation, and also on structural embeddedness. “Sec-
ond hand” information about prospective partners generates structural inertia in network
formation, as an agent is more likely to pair with partners that have been recommended
by previous partners. Thus our formal model generates results that are consistent with
other discussions of alliance formation (Kogut et al., 1992 for instance, or Uzzi, 1996, for
an empirical study that finds this eﬀect.).
4.1.5 Centrality
Finally, we turn to network centralization: to what extent do the emergent networks con-
tain stars? The answer is essentially that they do not. There is no pattern to network
centralization over the (α, θ) parameter space, and the measures are uniformly low: in the
range of 4 percent. The distribution of links over agents is relatively, though not completely,
uniform. No agent is able to capture a dominant position in these networks.
4.1.6 Graphical representation of the networks
In order to illustrate more visually the emerging patterns of networking, Figure 6 shows
typical networks obtained in 4 diﬀerent regions of the (α, θ)-space. We consider two values
of each of the parameters: α ∈ {.2, .8} and θ ∈ {.4, .8}. This illustrates regions of the
parameter space in which the emergent networks diﬀer in terms of degree and cliquishness.
Panels in the figure are arrayed correspondingly to the (α, θ)-values. Table 1 summarizes
the essential features of the networks that have formed, giving the size of the giant connected
component; average degree; cliquishness; excess cliquishness; and network centralization.
θ\α .2 .8
.8
Giant comp.: 98
∆ = 3.12
Cliq.: .094
Excess Cliq.: 1.54
Net. Centr.:4.0%
Giant comp.: 95
∆ = 2.88
Cliq.: .009
Excess Cliq.: .19
Net. Centr.: 3.22%
.4
Giant comp.: 55
∆ = 1.64
Cliq.: .108
Excess Cliq.: 1.18
Net. Centr.: 4.49%
Giant comp.: 49
∆ = 1.66
Cliq.: .077
Excess Cliq.: .83
Net. Centr.: 3.44%
Table 1: Summary statistics.
None of the graphs shown here is connected, but we can see that the giant component
is large for large θ and small for low θ. Note also that autarky is very common for low
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values of θ. Many agents actually pursue their innovative activities on their own, without
ever forming alliances with other firms. Excess cliquishness is higher for higher θ values,
which is where we observe more structure than would be present in a random network.11
Figure 6: Four typical networks.
4.2 Knowledge
In this section we examine two measures of knowledge performance: the distribution of
knowledge over individuals, and the extent to which individuals specialize in one type of
knowledge.12
11Visually, the networks shown here exhibit structures similar to networks from diﬀerent eras in the
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, as shown in Roijakkers, (2003), chapter 6.
12We cannot sensibly examine knowledge levels, as there is no way of normalizing the output to compare
diﬀerent parts of the parameter space. The pattern of knowledge levels is dominated by the eﬀect of θ: if
pooling is done using the maximum, inputs to innovation are in general larger, innovations are larger, and
knowledge levels grow faster.
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4.2.1 Knowledge distribution
Figure 7 depicts the relationship between the long run coeﬃcient of variation of individual
innovative potential and the parameters α and θ.
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Figure 7: Knowledge coeﬃcient of variation in the (α, θ)-space.
The extent to which indirect knowledge is used to evaluate potential partners (α) has
little eﬀect on this measure, but there is a clear negative relationship between the weight of
the maximum in pooled knowledge (θ) and the equality in distribution of knowledge over
agents. In the region of isolated innovators (θ < .25), inequality in knowledge distribution
is driven by initial conditions: agents who received a large knowledge endowment in the
initial random assignment are able to make large innovations. Their knowledge stocks
increase rapidly. Those with small initial endowments make small innovations and theirs
increase slowly, thereby magnifying initial diﬀerences. The parameter α has no eﬀect
because there is no networking. As networking becomes more intense, in the sense that
more agents regularly have partners, the distribution of innovative potential becomes more
equal. Joint innovation implies that partners move towards each other in knowledge space,
both in terms of where their expertise lies and (in relative terms) how much knowledge
they possess. The more intense is the networking activity, the stronger is this eﬀect. It is
compounded by the fact that when θ is large, the stable matching mechanism favours pairs
whose partners have highly complementary knowledge profiles. When this happens, the
knowledge accumulation process we have modelled has the eﬀect of decreasing the relative
gaps between agents relatively rapidly, which in turn implies a rapid decrease in the gap
between their innovative potentials. This convergence is exactly what the coeﬃcient of
variation captures, as the average relative distance to the average individual.
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4.2.2 Specialization
As agents innovate, their knowledge profiles change, and they can become generalists or
specialists. In Figure 8 we display the average individual specialization as measured by the
individual coeﬃcient of variation on knowledge endowments.
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Figure 8: Expertise (specialization) in the (α, θ)-space.
The idea here is that an agent’s knowledge is spread over the 5 categories, and if he
has significantly more in one category than in the others, he can be called a specialist,
whereas if the agent has roughly equal amounts in each of the categories, he would be a
generalist. The Herfindahl index provides a natural measure for this specialization. The
individual index has an analytical lower bound of 0 when all components of the endowment
are identical (the agent is a generalist), and an upper bound of 2 when all the knowledge
held by an agent is in one category (the agent is a pure expert). The eﬀect of θ is clear, with
the degree of specialization falling as pooling moves towards the maximum of the partners’
endowments.13 This figure shows essentially a mirror image of the pattern in Figure 1, the
density of the network. Agents become highly specialized when they innovate largely as
individuals. What drives this is that the type of knowledge produced is probabilistically
the same as the knowledge input. Thus an agent is likely to innovate where he has most
13Large θ also implies that the innovation task is separable, so here specialization could be eﬃcient.
Extreme specialization would not be eﬃcient in the context of the model, however, since there are 5 types
of input to the production function, and partnerships are restricted to two members. Generalizing the
model to permit larger coalitions would make specialization eﬃcient in this region. It is diﬃcult to sustain,
though, because of the nature of knowledge accumulation – all members of a partnership learn the same
thing, which immediately dilutes the specialization for most of them.
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knowledge. In expected value, this process will lead an agent to innovate always in the
same knowledge type, and so drive extreme specialization. When alliances form in a more
systematic way (larger θ) there is a rapid emergence of generalist profiles. Sometimes an
agent will innovate in his speciality, sometimes in his partner’s, and as θ increases, an agent
will have many diﬀerent partners. This will both smooth the agent’s profile immediately,
and possibly even shift his area of expertise. This sort of mixing produces much flatter
profiles, and the more partners an agent has, the more this mixing will take place.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a stylized but rich model of the innovation process in
which the underlying principle of innovation is the recombination of existing knowledge.
Heterogeneous knowledge actors form partnerships which are embedded cognitively, struc-
turally and relationally, and this embeddedness directly influences the choice of partner by
every firm. Over time this bilateral link formation process results in an emergent network
structure. We have analyzed the properties of this network and the corresponding patterns
of knowledge accumulation, and studied how they respond to changes in the cognitive divi-
sion of labour performed by the knowledge agents (the pooling parameter θ), and changes
in the relative importance of the sources of information accessed by firms in the network
(α).
First we find that there is a critical value of the knowledge pooling parameter θ where
the process tips from a world of firms operating in isolation when the innovation process is
not separable, to a collaborative world with intensive networking as innovation can be more
eﬀectively sub-divided into independent sub-tasks. Connectedness emerges for larger values
of the pooling parameter. As we move along the pooling dimension, the tendency of the
network is thus to evolve from a sea of isolated agents to an archipelago of pairs and small
subgroups, and finally to one big continent. This tendency is stronger when the weight
of “second hand” information is larger, i.e. α is small, and agents rely on past partners
for information regarding the value of potential future partners. This reliance generates
structural inertia in network formation. The emergent networks retain a relatively low
degree regardless of the parameters values: the average number of partnership reaches
20% of the population in a small part of the parameter space, but otherwise the networks
stay fairly sparse. When we look for structure by benchmarking the networks against the
“equivalent” random ones, we find that average distances between agents are only slightly
larger than those of a random graph, but that the measure of transitivity (the extent to
which “my friends are friends of each other”) significantly exceeds that of a random graph in
the zone in which my partners’ opinions are taken seriously (α ≤ .5) and where a cognitive
division of labour is feasible (θ ≥ .4). This suggests very clearly a network with more
structure than a random one, and more specifically a small world type of structure.
Regarding the properties of knowledge accumulation, the most marked result is the de-
cline of both inter-individual aggregate diﬀerences, and individual specialization as knowl-
edge pooling becomes easier (θ increases). It may seem at odds with the general intuition
that as labour division gets easier specialization should increase, but is easily understood
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when considering the way new knowledge is allocated to individuals: the field in which
novelty is created is common to both partners, and this precisely prevents specialization.14
Discussions of networks that arise from alliance formation, and empirical investigations
of real networks emphasize the importance of embedded interactions. The formal model
presented here shows a process by which the embeddedness of interactions translates into
diﬀerent network structures. Small worlds are commonly found in alliance networks, but
they are not the only structure present in empirical results. The model we have developed
can generate diﬀerent network structures, depending on paramaters, and in particular shows
when small worlds can be expected, depending not only on the nature of the embedded
relations, but also on the nature of the innovation task itself. Our results underline the
observation that understanding embedded relations is central in understanding the network
stsructures that we observe, but they also show the importance of understanding how firms
actually combine their knowledge to create innovations. Our model of this process provides
a way to address the issue of knowledge combination as an important aspect of innovation.
6 Appendix
In this appendix we provide the proofs for the analytical results on a single round of
matching.
Proposition 1 The roommate matching problem (S,Â) with preferences given by Equation
(9) has a unique stable matching µ.
Proof: The algorithm to construct the stable matching is as follows. Let S0 = S and
µ0 = {∅}. There exists a pair (a1, b1) such that F (a1b1) = max(i,j)∈S2 F (i, j). Then (a1, b1)
must belong to any stable assignment, as b1 is preferred by a1 to any other partner, and
this preference is reciprocal. No matching which does not involve this pair could be stable.
Hence the pair (a1, b1) is necessarily part of a stable matching.Let then µ1 = µ0+{(a1, b1)}
and S1 = S0 − {a1, b1}. It is possible that a1 = b1, in which case µ1 = µ0 + {(a1, a1)} and
S1 = S0− {a1}. Again there is a single pair within S1 maximizing the innovation function.
Proceed recursively this way. Denote p the smallest integer such that Sp = {∅}. Then
µp ≡ µ is a stable matching and q = 2p − n is the number of agents that have preferred
self-matching to cooperation. ¤
In case of a tie (that is to say when individual i can achieve the same innovative output
with two or more diﬀerent partners), we apply an arbitrary rule to guarantee that the score
function is still strict: if F (i, j) = F (i, k) then j Âi k if and only if j > k.
Proposition 2 As θ increases, the possibilities of collaboration as captured by the number
of acceptable partners increase for any agent i ∈ S.
Proof: We provide the derivation in 2 dimensions. It extends to any m > 2 but the
calculations are more tedious. Take x = (x1, x2) as a point in R
2
+. First we can restrict
14In Cowan et al. (2003) a situation in which people were innovating most often in their domain of
expertise was explored, and there of course as division got easier specialization increased. The contrast
between these two results indicates the importance of understanding exactly how new knowledge is absorbed
by economic actors.
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the set of x’s potential collaborations to Ax = {y ∈ R2+ : #{m : xm < ym} = 1}. Consider
y = (y1, y2) ∈ Ax, with x1 > y1 and x2 < y2. Agent x is then indiﬀerent between autarky
and collaboration with y iﬀ
(θx1 + (1− θ) y1)β + (θy2 + (1− θ)x2)β = xβ1 + x
β
2 .
This equality implictly defines a curve in R2+, the indiﬀerence frontier. The frontier goes
through x, since any agent is indiﬀerent between autarchy and partnering with an indetical
agent. Any y lying above this curve is preferred by x to isolation. Using the implicit
function theorem it is straightforwardly seen that
∂y1
∂θ
= −(θx1 + (1− θ) y1)
β (θy2 + (1− θ)x2) (x1 − y1)
(θx1 + (1− θ) y1)β (θy2 + (1− θ)x2) (1− θ)
−(θy2 + (1− θ)x2)
β (θx1 + (1− θ) y1) (y2 − x2)
(θx1 + (1− θ) y1)β (θy2 + (1− θ)x2) (1− θ)
,
which is negative. The same calculation shows that also ∂y2/∂θ < 0. Thus as θ increases
from 0 to 1 the frontier gets lower everywhere and thus more people become acceptable to
i. ¤
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